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2013 Bench Memorandum 
I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PARTIES 
The New Union Wildlife Federation (NUWF) is a not for 
profit corporation organized under the laws of New Union and 
fully funded by membership dues and contributions.  Its purpose 
is to protect the fish and wildlife of the state by protecting their 
habitats.  Members of NUWF use the Muddy River and adjacent 
wetlands for recreational activities and aesthetic enjoyment.  
NUWF was the plaintiff in the District Court and is an appellant 
on appeal. 
Jim Bob Bowman (Bowman) owns one thousand acres of 
wetlands adjacent to the Muddy River near the Town of Mudflats 
in the State of New Union.  Bowman leveled and filled in the vast 
majority of his wetlands without obtaining a permit to do so 
under the Clean Water Act.  Under an agreement with the New 
Union Department of Environmental Protection, he has reserved 
the remaining, untouched portion of his property as a public 
easement and permanent wetland.  Bowman was the respondent 
in the District Court and is the appellee on appeal. 
The New Union Department of Environmental Protection 
(NUDEP) is a state agency responsible for enforcing 
environmental laws in the State of New Union.  NUDEP entered 
into a settlement agreement with Bowman under which he will 
maintain a small portion of his property as a public easement and 
permanent wetland.  NUDEP incorporated this agreement into 
an administrative order but did not assess any monetary 
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penalties against Bowman.  NUDEP was an intervenor in the 
District Court and is an appellant on appeal. 
B. APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 301, 
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) 
Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) 
Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) 
Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) 
Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) 
Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) 
C. SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The undisputed facts established in the court below are as 
follows: 
Bowman owns one thousand acres of property with a 650-foot 
long border along the Muddy River, which is more than 500 feet 
wide and six feet deep at that point, forms the border between the 
states of New Union and Progress, and is used for recreational 
navigation. 
Bowman’s property, which lies within the river’s one hundred 
year floodplain, is partially inundated each year and is 
hydrologically connected to the Muddy.  It was previously covered 
with vegetation characteristic of a wetland, including trees.  All 
parties agree that it meets the definition of a wetland as provided 
in the Army Corp of Engineer’s Wetlands Delineation Manual. 
NUWF members Zeke Norton, Effie Lawless, and Dottie 
Milford use the Muddy River and sometimes the bank along 
Bowman’s property for recreational purposes such as boating, 
fishing, and picnicking.  For years, Norton has hunted for frogs 
for recreational and subsistence purposes on Bowman’s property 
despite appropriately posted “No Trespassing” signs and 
acknowledged in deposition testimony that he was “probably 
trespassing” while doing so. 
This controversy arose when Bowman, between June 15, 
2011 and July 15, 2011, used bulldozers to level his property, 
pushing the vegetation into rows and burning it.  He buried the 
ashes, moved soil from high portions of the property to low-lying 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/2
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portions and formed a large ditch to drain the field into the 
Muddy.  He did this without obtaining a CWA permit.  He left a 
150-foot wide strip of vegetation along the river untouched.  In 
September 2011, Bowman seeded the drained field with winter 
wheat. 
Although they cannot see any changes from the Muddy River 
as a result of Bowman’s actions (there are trees on Bowman’s 
remaining wetlands blocking the view), Milford, Lawless, and 
Norton are concerned over the effects of the loss of the wetland 
habitat.  They are aware of the environmental degradation this 
can cause and fear that the river is more polluted.  Additionally, 
Milford stated that the Muddy River looks more polluted to her 
than it did prior to Bowman’s activities.  Norton stated that he 
finds significantly fewer frogs than he did previously on 
Bowman’s property, only two or three where he used to find a 
dozen. 
On July 1, 2011, NUWF sent a notice of intent to sue 
Bowman under § 505 of the CWA to Bowman, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of New Union.  NUDEP 
then sent Bowman a notice of violation.  Bowman denied 
violating the CWA but entered into a consent agreement with 
NUDEP.  He agreed: 
1. Not to clear any more wetlands on his property; 
2. To construct a 75-foot wide buffer zone containing year-
round wetlands bordering the remaining 150-foot strip of 
wetlands along the river; and 
3. To grant a conservation easement allowing public entry 
for recreational use in this 650 x 275-foot area. 
NUDEP incorporated this agreement into an administrative 
order on August 1, 2011.  NUDEP did not include a penalty 
against Bowman although a state statute almost identical to § 
309 (a) and (g) of the CWA authorized it to do so.  33 U.S.C. § 
1319, (a), (g) (2006). 
On August 10, 2011, NUDEP brought suit under § 505 of the 
CWA against Bowman.  On August 30, 2011, NUWF also brought 
suit under § 505 of the CWA against Bowman seeking injunctive 
relief (remediation of the wetlands) and civil penalties for a 
violation of §§ 301(a) and 404.  NUDEP filed a motion to 
intervene in NUWF’s § 505 action.  On September 5, 2011, 
3
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NUDEP filed a motion in its own § 505 action to enter a consent 
decree with Bowman identical to the earlier administrative order.  
This motion is still pending. 
On November 1, 2012, the District Court granted NUDEP’s 
motion to intervene in NUWF’s § 505 action.  The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.  Bowman asserted that: 
1. NUWF lacked standing because it could not show an 
injury in fact fairly traceable to Bowman’s alleged 
violations; 
2. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because all 
violations were wholly past; 
3. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 
State of New Union had already taken an enforcement 
action and fully resolved the violations; and 
4. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a key 
element of a CWA cause of action – addition – is not 
satisfied. 
NUWF asserted that Bowman violated the CWA because he 
added dredged and fill material to navigable waters without a § 
404 permit.  NUDEP joined Bowman in his motion on the 
continuing violation and diligent prosecution issues and joined 
NUWF in its motion on the standing and addition issues. 
 
II. ISSUES 
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on 
appeal: 
  Whether NUWF has standing to sue Jim Bob 
Bowman for violating the CWA. 
o  On appeal, NUWF argues that it has 
standing. 
o  NUDEP also argues that NUWF has 
standing. 
o  Bowman argues that NUWF does not have 
standing because there is no injury in fact. 
  Whether there is a continuing or ongoing violation as 
required by § 505(a) of the CWA for subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/2
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o  On appeal, NUWF argues that there is a 
continuing violation because fill material is 
still present in the former wetlands. 
o  Bowman argues that the violations are wholly 
past because Bowman ceased filling the 
wetlands on July 15, 2011. 
o  NUDEP also argues that the violations are 
wholly past because Bowman ceased filling 
the wetland on July 15, 2011. 
  Whether NUWF’s citizen suit has been barred by 
NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Bowman as set out 
in § 505(b) of the CWA. 
o  On appeal, NUWF argues that NUDEP’s 
actions do not satisfy the diligent prosecution 
requirements of § 505. 
o  Bowman argues that NUDEP’s prosecution of 
and agreement with Bowman satisfy the 
requirements for diligent prosecution. 
o  NUDEP also argues that its prosecution of 
and agreement with Bowman satisfy the 
requirements for diligent prosecution. 
  Whether Bowman violated the CWA when he moved 
dredged and fill material from one part of a wetland 
adjacent to navigable water to another part of the 
same wetland. 
o NUWF argues that Bowman’s actions satisfy 
all of the elements required for a violation of 
§§ 301(a) and 404, including addition. 
o  NUDEP also argues that Bowman’s actions 
satisfy all of the elements required for a 
violation of §§ 301(a) and 404, including 
addition. 
o  Bowman argues that NUWF cannot satisfy 
the addition element of a CWA violation. 
III. STANDING: DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE NEW UNION WILDLIFE 
FEDERATION DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
SUE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO INJURY IN FACT 
5
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FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO BOWMAN’S 
ACTIVITIES? 
NUWF and NUDEP contend that NUWF has standing to 
sue Bowman for violating the CWA because it can show a 
concrete injury to its members’ aesthetic, recreational, and 
economic interest in the of the Muddy River that is traceable to 
Bowman’s activities and that will be redressed by a favorable 
decision in this case.  Bowman contends that NUWF does not 
have standing because it cannot show a concrete harm to its 
members resulting from his activities. 
Generally, in order to have Article III standing, a party must 
show a legally protected “concrete and particularized” injury that 
is “actual or imminent,” “fairly traceable” to the actions of the 
defendant, and “likely . . . [to be] redressed by a favorable 
decision.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992).  An injury may be aesthetic, recreational, or economic.  
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).  To sue on 
behalf of its members, an organization must show that it has 
members who would otherwise have standing to sue as 
individuals (i.e., who could satisfy the three prongs of Lujan), that 
its interest in the case is related to its purpose as an 
organization, and that the suit does not necessitate the 
participation of a member as an individual.1  Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 168, 
180-81 (2001); see also Atlantic States Legal Corp. v. Hamelin, 
182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
In this case, as framed by the lower court, the resolution of 
the standing issue turns on whether NUWF can show that its 
members satisfy the “injury in fact” prong of Lujan.2  NUWF and 
 
 1. NUWF’s mission to protect the habitats within New Union is germane to 
the citizen suit.  It would not be more appropriate for a single member of NUWF 
to bring the case. 
 2. There is also a valid question as to whether the alleged injuries are fairly 
traceable to Bowman’s actions – the second prong of Lujan.  However, there is 
little factual information relevant to this prong.  In response to any argument 
that the alleged injury is not fairly traceable to Bowman’s actions, NUWF and 
NUDEP may point to the fact that they did not notice a change in the Muddy or 
a decrease in the frog population until after Bowman filled his wetlands.  
Additionally, they did not have cause to be concerned about the negative effects 
on the river until after they were aware of Bowman’s actions.  The third, 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/2
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NUDEP are faced with a difficult argument on the facts but, 
nonetheless, should make a good faith effort to show a concrete, 
particularized injury to the NUWF members’ legally protected 
aesthetic, recreational, and economic (frogging) interests.  They 
need not show an injury to the environment, but should focus on 
injuries to their interests.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181 (the 
“relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not 
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”); see also 
Am. Canoe Ass’n v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 306 F. Supp. 2d 
30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff does not lose standing 
simply because . . . [something other than] polluted water . . . is 
the injury she suffers as a result of a CWA violation.”). 
NUWF and NUDEP will argue that NUWF has successfully 
shown a concrete injury in fact to its members.  Milford, Norton, 
and Lawless all testified that they use the Muddy River for 
recreational purposes.  They are aware of the ecological damage 
that results from impaired wetlands and “feel a loss” in the river’s 
ecology and habitat since Bowman filled in his wetlands.  They 
also testified that they are afraid that the Muddy is more polluted 
as a result of Bowman’s activities.  Importantly, while they 
cannot see an aesthetic injury to Bowman’s property from the 
river, Milford testified that the Muddy looks more polluted than it 
did prior to Bowman’s activities.  NUWF will liken the testimony 
of its members to that of the organizational plaintiff members in 
Laidlaw.  Similar to Milford’s testimony, one member of a 
plaintiff organization in Laidlaw made a sworn statement that 
the river “looked and smelled polluted” when he drove over it and 
that he was “concerned that the river was more polluted as a 
result of [the defendant’s] discharges.”  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-
82.  The Supreme Court found that this sworn statement and 
others to the same effect demonstrated an injury in fact. Id. at 
182.  Additionally, Norton testified that he has suffered an injury 
to his recreational and economic interest in frogging.  See infra 
Evidence Obtained While Trespassing.  NUWF and NUDEP will 
therefore argue that NUWF has shown what the Supreme Court 
required in Laidlaw – that their members use the Muddy River 
 
redressability prong is most likely satisfied; NUWF is suing for civil penalties 
which will deter future § 404 violations and injunctive relief to restore the 
wetlands, thereby remedying the alleged harm if they are successful in this suit. 
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and that the economic, “aesthetic and recreational values” that it 
holds for them have been lessened as a result of Bowman’s 
wetland destruction.  Id. at 182 (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 
735). 
In response, Bowman will argue that mere concern for the 
environment is insufficient to show an injury in fact under Sierra 
Club v. Morton.  He will contrast the NUWF members’ testimony 
with the testimony in Laidlaw, contending that the NUWF 
members have not suffered a sufficient injury to show standing.  
Unlike NUWF’s members, the Laidlaw plaintiff members noted 
that they had refrained from partaking in those aesthetic 
enjoyments and recreational activities as a result of the 
defendant’s CWA violations. See Laidlaw, 582 U.S. 182-83.  For 
example, the Laidlaw plaintiff who thought the river looked and 
smelled more polluted stated that he would like to “fish, camp, 
swim, and picnic” on and near the river but would not do so as a 
result of his concern over the pollution.  Id. at 182.  Other 
Laidlaw plaintiffs testified that they used to wade, bird watch, 
and canoe on and near the river but refrained from doing so 
because they were afraid of the pollution.  Id. at 182-83.  In 
contrast, Milton, Lawless, and Norton gave no testimony that 
their activities on and near the Muddy have changed as a result 
of their concern over pollution from Bowman’s activities.  In fact, 
Norton stated that he still frogs the area. 
Bowman will also point to cases in which similar alleged 
injuries were insufficient.  For example, Informed Citizens United 
v. USX Corp., held that the plaintiff organization did not have 
standing to sue for a § 404 violation.  The plaintiff proffered an 
affidavit from a member who used to bird watch near the 
wetlands and claimed his chances for watching birds would be 
diminished as the wetland vegetation disappeared; this was 
insufficient to show standing.  36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D. Tex. 
1999) (those “allegations fall far short of rising to the level of 
proof necessary to demonstrate a cognizable, redressable injury 
that can confer standing”).  If Bowman cites Informed Citizens, 
the opposing parties should point out that it preceded Laidlaw 
and the Supreme Court’s clarification of the injury in fact 
requirement. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/2
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In sum, Bowman will argue, NUWF can only show that its 
members are merely concerned about the alleged pollution and 
think that the river looks more polluted.  They have no evidence 
of pollution or environmental damage and have not changed their 
habits in relation to the river, a recurrent element in Laidlaw. 
In reply, NUWF and NUDEP will emphasize that the 
Supreme Court has only required that aesthetic and recreational 
enjoyment be lessened, as it has here, not ended or completely 
destroyed in order for organizational standing to attach. See 
Morton, at 135; see also Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (the 
“injury ‘need not be large, an identifiable trifle will suffice.’” 
(quoting Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990)).  They should 
also emphasize that their burden of proof for standing at this 
point in the litigation is lower than the burden at the trial stage – 
the plaintiff need only aver facts showing standing (using sworn 
statements, etc.) but do not need to prove those facts.  Lujan at 
504 U.S. at 561.  In this case, NUWF contends that it has averred 
specific facts via its members’ sworn statements showing all three 
requirements for standing and it need not do more to overcome 
Bowman’s motion for summary judgment. 
A. Evidence Obtained While Trespassing 
NUWF and NUDEP will argue that Norton’s recreational 
and economic interest in frogging has been lessened – there are 
significantly less frogs on Bowman’s property than before the 
wetlands were filled in.  However, because Norton was clearly 
trespassing on Bowman’s property while frogging (there was clear 
signage and he admitted that he was probably trespassing) and 
he could not have been aware of the decrease in the frog 
population but for this illegal act, there is room for argument over 
the validity of this evidence. 
Bowman will argue that interference with an illegal 
recreational activity cannot give rise to an injury in fact sufficient 
for Article III standing.  In Morton, which underlies much of 
NUWF and NUDEP’s standing argument, the Supreme Court 
addressed “legal wrongs” or “legal interests” as the constitutional 
basis for an injury in fact giving rise to standing.  405 U.S. at 733; 
see Steven G. Davison, Standing to Sue in Citizen Suits Against 
9
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Air and Water Polluters Under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 17 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 63, 70 (2003).  This implies that illegal interests, or those 
protected by law, cannot be a basis for an injury in fact giving rise 
to standing.  Adding further validity to Bowman’s argument, a 
careful reading of Lujan reveals that an injury in fact requires an 
invasion of a “legally protected interest.”  504 U.S. at 560.  
Therefore, illegal recreational activities such as poaching and 
illegal frogging are not recognized by the standing doctrine.  
However, there appear to be no specific cases addressing the 
specific issue of an injury in fact to an illegal hunting interest.3 
The parties may introduce the issue of whether the frog 
evidence was admissible given that it was obtained while 
trespassing.  The parties should not consume an excess amount of 
time arguing about this issue, which was not addressed in the 
court below and therefore may not be reviewable on appeal.4  See 
 
 3. Bowman might also point out that, while the Supreme Court has 
recognized fishing as a legal, recreational interest that can give rise to standing, 
it has never recognized harm to recreational hunting of wildlife (such as 
frogging) as an injury in fact.  Davison at 70.  However, NUWF and NUDEP 
will counter that lower federal courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have found an 
injury in fact sufficient to support standing when recreational hunting interests 
were invaded.  See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation & Enforcement, 620 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing 
injury to hunting as one typical of standing argument and sufficient for injury in 
fact); In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Litig., 627 F. 
Supp. 2d 16, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (injury in fact to sport hunting of polar 
bears); Ottowa Tribe of Okla. v. Speck, 447 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838-39 (N.D. Oh. 
2006) (injury in fact to tribe's claim for hunting and fishing rights). 
 4. Bowman may also argue that the frog evidence is inadmissible because 
it was obtained illegally and allowing it would be unfair and encourage illegal 
action by plaintiffs.  There is rather obscure case law on both sides of this issue.  
He may point to the exclusionary rule – the common practice in criminal cases of 
excluding evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment – for support by analogy.  See RONALD S. BEITMAN, GETTING 
YOUR HANDS ON THE EVIDENCE (ABA 2005).  Whether evidence illegally 
obtained by a civil litigant is admissible is left up to the trial judge in most 
jurisdictions, although the court below did not reach this issue. Id. at 35 (citing 
Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea Corp., 935 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1991)).  At common 
law, illegal means of obtaining evidence did not affect admissibility.  However, 
the judicially developed exclusionary rule has been applied in state civil cases 
where a party obtained it via inequitable or immoral means. See, e.g., Lebel v. 
Swincick, 354 Mich. 427 (1958).  In any case, this is the lesser of Bowman’s two 
arguments regarding the frog evidence. 
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26 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE  [Vol.  4 
 
Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 13 
(1st Cir. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that an issue not presented to the 
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal absent 
plain error” or “exceptional circumstances”). 
B. Improved Frog Habitat 
Bowman may argue, as the lower court did, that any injury 
to Norton’s interest in frogging along the Muddy is lessened or 
negated by the NUDEP biologist’s testimony that the new 
wetland habitat that Bowman has consented to build will create 
“a higher quality habitat, and more of it” for the frogs.  Based on 
this testimony, Norton can actually expect to benefit from 
Bowman’s consent agreement with NUDEP, finding more frogs in 
the year-round, partially inundated wetland that will be built and 
having legal accessing those lands via the public easement. 
However, NUWF and NUDEP will point to American Bottom 
Conservancy v. Army Corps of Engineers, in which the defendants 
made a similar argument. No. 09-603-GPM, 2010 WL 3894033, at 
*1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2010).  There, the court found that the 
plaintiff had no standing because “her anticipated injury 
disregard[ed] the fact that . . . nearly twice the amount of affected 
wetlands will be created in mitigation” and would benefit the 
wildlife that the plaintiff sought to protect. Id. at *7.  This 
position and the court’s reasoning that an injury in fact can be 
 
NUWF and NUDEP will respond that several federal courts have noted that 
illegally obtained evidence may be used in civil cases. Arista Records LLC v. 
Does 1-16, No. 1:08–CV–765, 2009 Westlaw 414060 at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 
2009) (“Even if the information was illegally obtained, this does not necessarily 
foretell its inadmissibility during a civil trial.”); United States v. One 1953 
Oldsmobile Sedan, 132 F. Supp. 14, 18 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (“. . . [I]n a civil case 
ordinarily evidence, although illegally obtained, is nevertheless admissible.”).  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that it has not excluded evidence 
obtained by illegal search and seizure from civil cases. United States v. Janis, 
428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976).  Bowman might make several arguments that those 
cases are not persuasive.  Janis discusses evidence illegally seized by the 
government in a criminal investigation and later used in a related civil case.  
This is different than the situation here, where there is no relation to a criminal 
case and where the plaintiff is seeking to benefit from evidence that it 
admittedly obtained in violation of state law, not for law enforcement purposes.  
Bowman may also argue that Oldsmobile’s statement about illegally obtained 
evidence is dicta from over sixty years ago and that Arista merely cites that 
dicta. 
11
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negated by planned wetlands mitigation – Bowman’s argument – 
were clearly rejected on appeal.  Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 2011).  While 
the planned wetlands might be “a boon to the environment” in the 
future, this issue is irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ injury within the 
context of standing.  Id. at 659-60 (It is actually relevant to the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant).  NUWF and 
NUDEP may also echo the American Bottom plaintiff’s concerns 
that the positive effects of the planned wetlands are speculative 
and temporally distant.  These future plans do nothing to 
increase or preserve the wildlife population or the plaintiff’s 
interest at this time and do not guarantee that the wildlife will 
return in the same or greater numbers in the future.  Id. at 659. 
IV. CONTINUING VIOLATION: DID THE LOWER 
COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT IT LACKED 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE 
ANY VIOLATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
WAS WHOLLY PAST AT THE TIME NEW UNION 
WILDLIFE FEDERATION FILED ITS 
COMPLAINT? 
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), the Supreme Court held that § 505(a) of 
the CWA requires that an alleged violation be ongoing, 
continuing, or intermittent at the time the plaintiff files its 
complaint in order for the District Court to have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In other words, there is no federal jurisdiction over 
citizen suits for wholly past violations of the CWA.  Id. at 385. 
The alleged violation in this case is the discharge of 
pollutants (dredged spoil and biological materials) into a 
navigable water (Bowman’s wetlands) without a § 404 permit.5  
 
 5. Bowman may argue that his discharge of materials is exempt from CWA 
jurisdiction under § 404(f) as a “normal farming, silviculture, and ranching 
activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for 
the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water 
conservation practices” and other farming activities.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1).  
However, § 404(f) goes on to say that the exemption does not apply to an action 
“having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to 
which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable 
waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced.”  33 U.S.C. § 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/2
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33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362.  All parties have agreed that 
Bowman’s wetlands constitute navigable waters and that the 
dredged and fill materials are pollutants.  The only contested 
element of the violation is “addition.”  See infra Addition section. 
NUWF contends that the District Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over its citizen suit because the presence of 
unpermitted, unremediated dredged and fill material in the 
wetlands on Bowman’s property without a permit is a continuing 
violation of the CWA.  Bowman and NUDEP contend that the 
District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
NUWF’s citizen suit because Bowman ceased violating the CWA 
prior to the filing of NUWF’s complaint.  There appears to be a 
split of authority in the courts on this issue. 
NUWF’s main argument will be that the continued presence 
of dredged and fill material in the wetlands is a continuing 
violation of the CWA.  Under this line of reasoning, the fact that 
Bowman stopped adding pollutants to his wetlands on July 11, 
2011 is irrelevant.  Several cases support NUWF’s continuing 
violation theory.  In particular, in Sasser v. Administrator, the 
Fourth Circuit held that there was subject matter jurisdiction 
over an EPA enforcement action because the continued presence 
of illegally placed dredged and fill material in a wetland was a 
continuing violation of the CWA.  990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 
1993) (“Each day the pollutant remains in the wetlands without a 
permit constitutes an additional day of violation.”). 
Additionally, NUWF may make strong comparisons between 
this case and Center for Biological Diversity v. Marina Point 
Development Associates, which held that a § 404 violation was 
continuing where the defendant illegally dumped fill material 
into a wetland and where the defendant could remove the 
pollutants from the wetland but failed to do so.  434 F. Supp. 2d 
789, 797 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  Like Bowman, the Marina Point 
defendant deposited pollutants into a wetland by clearing the site 
with bulldozers without a § 404 permit and had yet to receive a § 
404 permit for the fill at the time the citizen suit was filed.  Id. at 
 
1344(f)(2); see Avoyelles, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming that §404(f)(2) 
removes the farming exemption in cases where the defendant converts wetlands 
to a non-wetlands use).  NUWF has a strong argument that Bowman’s actions 
fall under the latter definition and require a permit. 
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798.  Also like Bowman, the Marina Point defendant entered into 
an agreement (an “Internal Corrective Measure Order”) with a 
government agency (the Army Corps of Engineers) after illegally 
material in the wetlands.  Id. at 794.  NUWF will argue that the 
Twelfth Circuit should follow these examples and find that the 
continued presence of illegally placed fill material in a wetland is 
a continuing violation of the CWA regardless of whether the 
defendant stopped adding fill material or entered into an 
agreement with a government agency prior to the filing of the 
complaint. 
NUWF will strengthen its argument by drawing attention to 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Gwaltney, which explains that § 
505’s “to be in violation” language refers to “a state rather than 
an act” and that a defendant “remains . . . ‘in violation’ of [an 
effluent] standard or limitation so long as it has not put in place 
remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the 
violation.”  484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J. concurring).  Using this 
“state rather than an act” reasoning, NUWF will argue that a 
CWA violation includes not just the illegal placement of fill 
material but also the consequences of that act.  The failure to 
remedy those consequences or to obtain a § 404 permit is itself 
part of the continuing violation.  See N.C. Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Woodbury, No. 87–584–CIV–5, 1989 Westlaw 106517 at *2 
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 1989) (finding a continuing violation where 
defendants failed to remove pollutants from a wetland).  This 
reasoning is also supported by public policy.  If courts considered 
wetlands violations wholly past once the act of illegally adding 
the fill ceases, few plaintiffs would be able to enforce § 404 and 
violators would have even stronger incentive to conceal their 
actions.  Id. at *3. 
In the court below, NUWF differentiated between § 402 and 
§ 404 violations on this issue – effluent violations may not 
continue beyond the violation itself while the presence of fill 
material allows a wetlands violation to continue beyond the 
violation.  However, on appeal, it may show that some § 402 
violations (and even violations of other statutes) continue well 
beyond an illegal act for the purposes of § 505.  For example, one 
court found a continuing violation under Gwaltney where the 
consequences of an effluent limitation violation continued to be 
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felt years after the violation took place.  Umatilla Water Quality 
Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1312, 1321-22 (D. Or. 1997) (ongoing migration of pollutants from 
brine pond when pollutants were no longer being added was a 
continuing violation); see also United States v. Werlien, 746 F. 
Supp. 887, 896-97 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 
(discussing Gwaltney and finding that continued presence of 
pollutants in soil dumped years earlier was continuing violation 
of RCRA); Fl. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So.2d 
512, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (continuing but abatable 
seepage of pollutants into groundwater from abandoned property 
was continuing violation of state CERCLA).  The continuing 
violation from an effluent left in soil or a pond is analogous to 
Bowman’s violation and lends credence to NUWF’s argument that 
a violation may continue beyond the illegal act. 
Bowman and NUDEP’s main argument will be that there is 
no continuing or intermittent violation that satisfies § 505 in this 
case.  Bowman ceased violating the CWA by adding fill material 
to his wetlands on July 15, 2011, well before NUWF filed its 
complaint.  There is no indication that he will violate the CWA 
again; he has no need to add more fill material to his property 
and entered into the consent agreement promising to maintain 
the remaining wetlands on his property.  In order to support this 
argument, Bowman and NUDEP must refute NUWF’s contention 
that the continued presence of fill material is a continuing 
violation by distinguishing this case from those supporting 
NUWF’s theory and by presenting cases with opposite holdings. 
Bowman and NUDEP will attempt to distinguish this case 
from Sasser by highlighting the fact that Sasser was an 
enforcement action by the administrator of the CWA and not a 
citizen suit.  990 F.2d at 127.  They will also distinguish this case 
from Marina Point by emphasizing that the defendants in that 
case showed clear signs that they would have continued to 
illegally fill the wetlands but for a court injunction and were 
uncooperative with and even disobeyed government orders.  434 
F. Supp. 2d at 798.  In contrast, Bowman has clearly stopped 
adding fill to his wetlands, shows no sign that he will resume 
such activities, and has cooperated with NUDEP. 
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Bowman and NUDEP will also cite cases in which courts 
have held that the continued presence of a pollutant in a wetland 
does not constitute a continuing violation of the CWA.  For 
example, in United States v. Rutherford Oil Co., the court found 
no continuing violation where the alleged violations had occurred 
prior to the filing of the complaint and only the effects of the 
violation remained.  756 F. Supp. 2d 782 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“A 
discharge in violation of an obligation under § 311 [of the CWA] is 
not a continuing violation on the basis that the discharger fails to 
remedy its effects.”); see also United States v. Scruggs, No. G-06-
776, 2009 WL 81921 at *11 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2009) (a single 
violation of § 404 with continued effects on the environment is not 
a continuing violation).  They will proceed to compare Bowman’s 
actions to the isolated, past violations in these cases and argue 
that his violations are wholly past despite any continued effects 
or failure to remedy. 
In response to any cases that NUWF presents finding a 
continuing violation of § 402 due to the continued effects of a past 
illegal act, Bowman and NUDEP will present cases holding that 
the violation is not continuing where it merely affects the 
environment after the illegal act has ended.  For example, in 
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., the Fifth Circuit 
found that continued negative effects on grasslands from 
pollutants previously leaked into the ground did not constitute a 
continuing violation of § 402. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).  While 
this is a pre-Gwaltney case, other courts have held post-Gwaltney 
that there is no ongoing § 402 violation simply because the 
pollutants still affect the environment. See Friends of Santa Fe 
Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1353-54 (D.N.M. 
1995) (“Migration of residual contamination resulting from 
previous releases is not an ongoing discharge . . .”); Wilson v. 
Amoco Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 939, 975-76 (D. Wyo. 1993) 
(continued migration of residual contamination was not a 
continuing violation of § 402); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Assoc. v. 
Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993) (no 
continuing violation even where lead shot left in ground was 
leaching pollutants into navigable waters).  Bowman and NUDEP 
may also frame this issue as irrelevant to this case, which does 
not address § 402 violations. 
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In the alternative, Bowman and NUDEP may argue that 
Bowman has in fact attempted to remedy his violations by 
entering into the consent agreement with NUDEP and promising 
to maintain an easement and year-round wetlands on his 
property.  Bowman may also argue that the consent decree with 
NUDEP excuses him from any further remediation.  NUWF 
should respond by pointing out that, under the agreement, 
Bowman will only be required to preserve and restore just over a 
single acre of wetlands or .001% of the wetlands that he cleared 
and filled; this is not sufficient remediation of the damage done to 
show that the § 404 violation has ceased. 
Effect on Statute of Limitations 
The lower court noted that the idea that a CWA violation is 
continuing until the illegally placed material is removed is 
untenable because the statute of limitations would never begin to 
run.  This is not a major issue in this case because Bowman’s 
actions clearly fall within the traditional five-year statute of 
limitations for federal civil offenses.  Therefore, if the parties 
address this sub-issue, it should only be within a policy-type 
argument and should not involve significant time or resources. 
While Bowman and NUDEP will argue with the lower 
court, NUWF will respond that many courts have recognized the 
use of the continuing violation doctrine as a valid, equitable 
defense to a statute of limitations bar.  The purpose of the statute 
of limitations is to prevent the litigation of stale cases.  However, 
cases such as this one, where evidence of the defendant’s actions 
and their effects are still clear, are not stale and, therefore, 
should not be barred.  NUWF will cite Stillwater of Crownpoint 
Homeowners Association v. Kovich, where the court held that “the 
five-year statute of limitations for [CWA] claims that a person 
unlawfully placed fill in a wetland does not begin to run as long 
as the fill remains in place.”  820 F. Supp. 2d 859, 896 (N.D. Ind. 
2011); see also Am. Canoe Ass’n, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (statute 
of limitations does not run if there is an ongoing violation); 
United States v. Reaves, 923 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (M.D. Fl. 1996). 
V. DILIGENT PROSECUTION: DID THE LOWER 
COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT IT LACKED 
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE 
THE STATE OF NEW UNION HAD ALREADY 
TAKEN AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION AND FULLY 
RESOLVED ANY VIOLATION OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT? 
Under § 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA, a citizen suit is barred if 
the “State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil . . . 
action in a court of the United States . . . to require compliance . . 
.” with the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006).  NUWF 
contends that its citizen suit should not be barred.  NUDEP and 
Bowman contend that NUWF’s citizen suit should be barred 
because they have entered into an agreement incorporated into 
an administrative order addressing the violation and because 
NUDEP is currently suing Bowman over the same facts.  Diligent 
prosecution is a complicated, fact-intensive issue and there are 
arguments and supporting case law on both sides in this case. 
Bowman and NUDEP will emphasize that courts presume 
diligent prosecution by the state enforcement agency.  Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 
487 (D.S.C. 1995).  “The state . . . agency must be given great 
deference to proceed in a manner it considers in the best interests 
of all parties involved.”  Id. at 486 (citing Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n 
v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (E.D.Ark.1993), 
aff’d, 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994)).  Citizen-plaintiffs – NUWF in 
this instance – have the heavy burden of demonstrating that the 
state has not diligently prosecuted the violation.  Id. at 486-87.  
In determining whether a violation has been diligently 
prosecuted, the court will consider whether the settlement with 
the state provides for a lack of substantial relief.  Id. at 490.  In 
considering this factor, the citizen-plaintiff must show more than 
the “fact that [the] settlement reached by the state is less 
burdensome to the defendant than the remedy sought in the 
[citizen suit] complaint . . .”  Id.  This fact alone is not enough to 
show that the agency has failed to diligently prosecute the 
violation.  Id. 
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NUWF will argue6 that NUDEP’s actions to enforce § 404 
against Bowman are both (1) procedurally insufficient due to the 
excessive speed with which the agency reached an agreement 
with Bowman and (2) substantially insufficient in that they failed 
to include a civil penalty and only required minimal remediation 
or mitigation.  See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 479-80 (D.S.C.).7 
A. Procedural Insufficiency 
In Laidlaw, the District Court noted that the settlement 
agreement between the defendant and state was “entered into 
with unusual haste,” which raises concern over the citizen-
plaintiff’s ability to intervene and participate in the enforcement 
process.  Id. at 489.  NUWF will argue that NUDEP has also 
acted with unusual haste.  It received notice of Bowman’s 
violation on July 1 and entered an administrative order 
incorporating its consent agreement with Bowman on August 1 – 
a mere thirty days later.  It filed suit on August 10 for no 
apparent reason besides blocking NUWF’s citizen suit.  Bowman 
and NUDEP should respond by citing the District Court’s 
statement that, “although suspect,” the unusual procedural 
aspects (including the fact that the defendant drafted the 
agreement and even paid the filing fee for the suit against it) 
were not enough to show lack of diligent prosecution.  Id. at 489-
90.  They may also argue that they merely acted expeditiously in 
a case that did not require a large investment of time and 
resources to resolve. 
 
 6. NUWF may argue that NUDEP’s § 505 suit against Bowman is barred 
because NUDEP failed to wait the requisite sixty days to commence its suit.  33 
U.S.C. 1365(b)(1)(A).  (NUDEP did not discover Bowman’s violation until July 1 
and commenced suit on August 10, twenty days earlier than allowed.)  This 
nullifies Bowman and NUDEP’s claim that the state has commenced suit in a 
court of the U.S. as required by the diligent prosecution provision, forcing it to 
rely solely on the administrative order to show diligent prosecution.  See § 
1365(b)(1)(B). 
 7. The subsequent Supreme Court opinion did not directly address this 
issue of diligent prosecution. 
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B. Substantive Insufficiency 
NUWF will also argue that NUDEP’s enforcement of the 
CWA is substantively insufficient in that they have not required 
Bowman to sufficiently remediate or mitigate his § 404 violations.  
The consent agreement and administrative order only require 
Bowman to preserve and rebuild just over one acre of property on 
the 650 x 275 foot portion of land closest to the Muddy – about 
.001% of the wetlands he destroyed.  In contrast, for permitted 
damage to wetlands – which Bowman’s was not – the Army Corps 
of Engineers requires a one-to-one ratio of compensatory 
wetlands mitigation or sufficient mitigation to offset the loss of 
the wetlands.  General Compensatory Mitigation Requirements, 
73 Fed. Reg. 19627, 19633 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
pt. 332.3 and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.93). 
Furthermore, NUWF will contend that NUDEP’s 
enforcement is substantively insufficient because it did not 
include civil penalties.  There is currently a split of authority 
among the federal circuits as to how the assessment of civil 
penalties (or lack thereof) by the state agency affects the diligent 
prosecution bar for citizen suits.  Some courts have held that a 
citizen suit will not be barred unless the state has assessed civil 
penalties in an amount comparable to the amount provided for in 
the CWA’s civil enforcement provision.  NUWF will highlight 
those opinions, arguing that because NUDEP did not include a 
penalty in its administrative order to Bowman despite being 
authorized to include a penalty of up to $125,000, NUDEP’s 
action does not constitute “diligent prosecution.”  See Citizens for 
a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 861 F. Supp. 889, 911 
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a CWA citizen suit was not barred 
because the $2 million payment made by defendant did not 
constitute a “penalty” under the CWA); Molokai Chamber of 
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (D. 
Haw. 1995) (holding that “in order for state enforcement action to 
bar citizen’s suit under . . . state enforcement must seek 
penalties, not mere compliance”); Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. 
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1344 (D.N.M. 1995) 
(holding a CWA citizen suit not barred where state agency had 
only “compelled Defendants to remediate the site and contain 
acid mine discharges,” but had not sought penalties). 
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In contrast, other circuits have held that state administrative 
enforcement actions will bar a CWA citizen suit even in the 
absence of civil penalties if those enforcement actions are directed 
at the same actions as the citizen suit.  Bowman and NUDEP 
will argue that NUDEP’s action constitutes “diligent 
prosecution,” and thus this CWA citizen suit should be barred 
despite the fact that there were no penalties.  They will argue 
that the remedial actions that Bowman and NUDEP incorporated 
into the administrative order and NUDEP’s suit against Bowman 
are sufficient to bar NUWF’s citizen suit even in the absence of 
civil penalties.  See N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town 
of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a CWA 
citizen suit for penalties may be barred even if the state did not 
seek to sanction the offender monetarily where the “corrective 
action already taken and diligently pursued by the government 
seeks to remedy the same violations as [the] duplicative civilian 
action”); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 
Inc., 777 F. Supp. 173, 183 (D. Conn. 1991) (holding that a CWA 
citizen suit was barred even though state “enforcement was 
limited to an order terminating lead discharges and mandating 
remediation of lead contamination” and did not “assess monetary 
penalties, . . . compel defendant to obtain an NPDES permit, and . 
. . require the termination of discharges other than lead”); Pape v. 
Menominee Paper Co., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 273, 277 (W.D. Mich. 
1994) (holding that a consent order between paper manufacturing 
company and state agency barred CWA citizen suit); Sierra Club 
v. Colo. Ref’g Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1476 (D. Colo. 1994) 
(holding that the “state need not [attempt] to assess penalties, to 
exclusion of other remedies, in order to satisfy ‘prosecution’ 
requirement of CWA section barring citizen suits . . . [for] 
violations . . . which state has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting action under comparable state law”). 
Bowman and NUDEP should point out the redundant or 
duplicative nature of NUWF’s citizen suit and NUDEP’s 
agreement with and subsequent suit against Bowman – both are 
aimed at the same exact party and the same alleged violations.  
See Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556.  They may also emphasize 
that citizen suits are meant to supplement state enforcement 
actions where the state is unable or unwilling to act.  See 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60; Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555.  In 
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this case, they will contend, NUDEP has acted and there is no 
room for NUWF to supplement its enforcement action. 
In response, NUWF may re-emphasize the insufficient 
remediation and mitigation NUDEP has required.  It will argue 
that NUDEP has not diligently prosecuted Bowman by showing 
the drastic difference between remediation required in those 
cases cited by Bowman and remediation required by NUDEP.  
For example, as part of the settlement in Town of Scituate, the 
defendant sewage treatment plant was required to submit daily, 
weekly, and monthly test results to the agency, spend $1 million 
on a remediation plan, and enforce a moratorium on sewer 
hookups.  949 F.2d at 556.  In contrast, Bowman merely had to 
stop clearing his land, which he had already stopped clearing and 
had no reason to begin again, and build a wetland on a small 
piece of property.  This is insufficient to show diligent prosecution 
in the absence of civil penalties. 
NUWF may also turn to a policy argument to show that 
NUDEP has not diligently prosecuted Bowman by failing to 
assess civil penalties.  Civil penalties are meant to “reduce 
pollution of the nation’s waterways by deterring persons from 
violating” the CWA and, to be effective, must require polluters to 
disgorge the economic benefit of violating.  Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. 
at 491-92 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422–23, 
(1987) and Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 
F.2d 1128, 1141 (11th Cir.1990)).  Because Bowman did not have 
to pay a penalty for turning almost one thousand acres of 
wetlands into a wheat field in violation of § 404, he may realize 
an economic benefit from the wheat production, making it more 
attractive to violate than to comply and lessening the deterrent 
effect of the CWA penalty provisions. See id.; see also Laidlaw, 
528 U.S. at 185-88. 
In response, Bowman and NUDEP may make a policy 
argument that issuing a monetary penalty against Bowman may 
restrict his ability to perform the remediation.  If NUDEP 
ordered Bowman to pay a fine for his CWA violations, then he 
would have less money to put toward the constructing and 
maintaining the year-round wetland on his property, which will 
benefit the environment and NUWF. 
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VI. ADDITION: DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT BOWMAN’S ACTIVITIES ON HIS 
WETLAND PROPERTY DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT BECAUSE THEY DID NOT 
AMOUNT TO THE “ADDITION” OF A POLLUTANT 
TO A NAVIGABLE WATER? 
The CWA prohibits the “addition” of a pollutant, including 
dredged and fill material, to navigable waters without a permit – 
in this case a § 404 permit.8  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12).  
There is no question as to whether the wetlands on Bowman’s 
property, which are adjacent and hydrologically connected to the 
navigable Muddy River, are considered “navigable water” under 
the CWA.9  The issue here is whether Bowman’s actions amount 
to the “addition” of a pollutant to navigable water.  Bowman 
contends that he did not add a pollutant to navigable water – he 
merely moved materials within a single wetland, adding nothing 
new – and therefore he did not violate the CWA.  NUWF and 
NUDEP contend that Bowman’s land clearing activities resulted 
in the addition of pollutants to navigable water and therefore he 
did violate the CWA. 
There are two theories on which Bowman may rely to argue 
that there was no addition: (1) the material was not added 
because it did not come from the outside world; and (2) it was not 
added because the wetland and Muddy are one water body (the 
unitary waters theory).  He may also argue that his alleged 
addition is not regulated under the incidental fallback exception 
to § 404.  While these are tough arguments for Bowman to make 
in this case, there are authorities on both sides of each sub-issue 
for parties to cite. 
 
 8. See supra note 5 for discussion of whether Bowman’s actions fall under a 
farming exception to § 404. 
 9. The term “navigable waters” includes “wetlands with a continuous 
surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own 
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.” 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006).  All parties have agreed that 
Bowman’s property is navigable water. 
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A. “Outside World” 
It is EPA’s position, adopted by the D.C. Circuit, “that 
addition from a point source occurs only if the point source itself 
physically introduces a pollutant into water from the outside 
world.”  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-75 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).  Bowman will contend that, 
because his land clearing activities merely pushed pollutants 
from one part of his property to another, he did not add those 
pollutants from the “outside world.”  Thus, he will argue, there is 
no addition and no CWA violation. 
NUDEP and NUWF will emphasize that the Gorsuch court’s 
“outside world” interpretation of addition was made in the 
context of § 402 of the CWA.  However, Bowman will point out 
that courts have held that the same term used in different parts 
of the same statute has the same meaning unless Congress 
clearly provides otherwise.  See Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 
475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986).  Therefore, Bowman will argue that the 
“outside world” interpretation of addition applies to both § 402 
and § 404 of the CWA.  In essence, Bowman will contend that he 
has not violated the CWA because he has not added anything (or 
at least nothing new) to his wetland from the “outside world.”  See 
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). 
In response, NUDEP and NUWF will argue that the 
addition element has two different meanings under § 402 and § 
404, despite the fact that both sections appear in the same 
statute.  See Alison M. Dornsife, From a Nonpollutant into a 
Pollutant: Revising EPA’s Interpretation of the Phrase “Discharge 
of any Pollutant” in the Context of NPDES Permits, 35 ENVTL. L. 
175, 192 (2005).  Under § 402 (addressing NPDES permits), the 
discharge of a pollutant only requires a permit if there is an 
addition of a material from the outside world.  See id.  However, 
under § 404 (addressing dredged and fill permits), the discharge 
of a pollutant encompasses moving material from one place in the 
water body to another, even within the same water body. See id. 
NUDEP and NUWF will also cite case law to support their 
argument that Bowman’s intra-wetland activities amount to the 
addition of a pollutant even if he didn’t add new materials from 
outside of the wetland.  For example, in United States v. Deaton, 
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the Fourth Circuit held that “sidecasting”10 within a single 
wetland – a lesser activity than Bowman’s large-scale land 
clearing – constitutes the discharge of a pollutant under the 
CWA.  209 F.3d 331, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2000).  Deaton clearly 
rejected the argument (comparable to Bowman’s) that there was 
no CWA violation because the defendant merely moved soil and 
plant matter within a single wetland resulting in no “net 
increase” of material in that wetland.  Id.  The court was “not 
impressed” by the “no net increase” of material theory.  Id.  It 
emphasized that the defendants violated the CWA not when they 
merely added material to the wetland, but when they dug up 
vegetation and returned it (even in the same amount to the same 
wetland) as dredged spoil – a pollutant.  Id. at 336.  Just as the 
Deaton defendant did, Bowman dug up material, turned it into a 
pollutant, and returned it to the wetland, adding pollutants 
where there had been none before.  Id.  Bowman will respond by 
citing National Wildlife Federation v. Consumer Powers 
Company, in which the Sixth Circuit held that there was no 
addition where a power facility sucked live fish into its turbines 
and returned dead fish to the navigable waters.  862 F.2d 580, 
585-86 (6th Cir. 1988).  Bowman will compare his removal of live 
plants and return of dead plant material to the wetland with the 
power plant and the fish, which did not constitute an addition of 
material. 
Additionally, NUDEP and NUWF may argue that the 
environmental harm that results from dredge and fill activities 
necessitates their regulation even if they occur solely within a 
single wetland.  The Deaton court explained that dredging and 
filling, no matter the scale, are harmful.  When Congress 
“[classified] dredged spoil as a pollutant, [it] determined that 
plain dirt, once excavated from waters of the United States, could 
not be redeposited into those waters without causing harm to the 
environment.”  Id. at 336.  The court described many harmful 
consequences of dredging in wetlands, noting that the redeposit of 
dredged spoil into a water body or wetland can release pollutants 
that had previously been trapped.  Id. (citing Office of Technology 
Assessment, U.S. Congress, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation 
 
 10. Sidecasting occurs when one piles excavated dirt next to the excavation 
site within the same wetland.  See Deaton, 209 F.3d at 333. 
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48-50 (1984)).  NUWF and NUDEP should emphasize the court’s 
statement that it is “no less harmful when the dredged spoil is 
redeposited in the same wetland from which it was excavated.  
The effects on hydrology and the environment are the same.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, they will argue that even though 
Bowman did not add any pollutants to his wetland from the 
“outside world,” his activities must still be regulated because they 
result in harm to the environment, and because courts (including 
the Fourth Circuit) have upheld the regulation of such intra-
wetland activities. 
B. Unitary Waters Theory 
Under the unitary navigable waters theory, all navigable 
waters are one for the purposes of § 301(a) of the CWA.  EPA’s 
application of the theory is inconsistent and primarily relied upon 
to support its Waters Transfer Rule.  See Friends of the 
Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Management Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 
1217-18, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the theory has a 
“low batting average” but granting deference to EPA’s Water 
Transfer Rule incorporating the theory). 
As the lower court did, Bowman may use the unitary waters 
theory to argue that his land clearing activities did not 
technically add any pollutants to the wetlands since the 
pollutants were merely moved within a single body of navigable 
water.  Therefore, the “addition” element of the § 404 violation 
has not been satisfied as the CWA requires.  This is essentially 
an extension of his “outside world” argument: If moving 
pollutants between two water bodies is not an addition under the 
unitary waters theory, then how can his moving material within 
a single wetland be an addition?  Unfortunately, Bowman’s 
argument on this point is theoretical and weak. 
NUWF and NUDEP will respond that the unitary waters 
theory has been struck down in almost every court of appeals as 
contrary to the purpose of the CWA (except for the Eleventh 
Circuit, which recognized it in granting EPA Chevron deference).  
Id.  For example, in Catskill Mountains I and II, the Second 
Circuit clearly rejected the unitary waters theory, finding that a 
transfer of water and pollutants between two distinct water 
bodies violated the CWA.  Catskill Mountains Ch. of Trout Unltd., 
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Inc. v. City of New York (Catskills I), 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d 
Cir.2001); Catskill Mountains Ch. of Trout Unltd., Inc. v. City of 
New York (Catskills II), 451 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2006) (“. . . This 
theory would lead to the absurd result that the transfer of water 
from a heavily polluted . . . water body to one that was pristine . . 
. would not constitute an ‘addition’ of pollutants and would not be 
subject to the [CWA].”); see also Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 
F.3d 1273, 1296 (1st Cir.1996) (“[T]here is no basis in law or fact 
for the district court’s ‘singular entity’ [unitary waters] theory.”).  
Although the Supreme Court has not directly rejected the theory, 
it has suggested that it is inconsistent with portions of the CWA.  
Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1218 (citing S. Fla. Water 
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106-07 
(2004)). 
Bowman may also try to rely on the Water Transfer Rule 
itself, which states that where one transfers water from one 
distinct water body to another distinct water body and does not 
add any pollutants to that water during the transfer process, that 
activity is not subject to the CWA’s NPDES permitting 
requirements.11  In response to any allegation that he added 
pollutants to the Muddy in violation of § 301 (although that is not 
the main focus of this citizen suit), he might argue that the 
Muddy and his property are hydrologically connected and are one 
unit under the theory, precluding his transfer of water and 
pollutants into the river via a ditch from being an addition.  This 
is not a strong argument. 
NUDEP and NUWF can easily show that Bowman’s addition 
of dredged and fill material to his property does not meet the 
definition of a “water transfer.”  See supra note 11.  He did not 
convey or connect two different waters of the United States when 
 
 11. A water transfer is defined as “an activity that conveys or connects 
waters of the [U.S.] without subjecting the transferred water to intervening 
industrial, municipal, or commercial use.  This exclusion does not apply to 
pollutants introduced by the water transfer activity itself to the water being 
transferred.”  40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2012).  Water transfers “embody how States 
and resource agencies manage the nation’s water resources and balance 
competing needs for water.”  Memo. from Ann R. Klee, Gen. Counsel, and, 
Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm’r for Water, U.S. EPA, to Regional 
Administrators Regarding Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 
of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers 9 (Aug. 5, 2005). 
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he added dredged and fill material to a wetland in violation of § 
404.  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
Water Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,702 (June 13, 2008) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (“water transfers convey one water 
of the U.S. into another”). 
NUWF and NUDEP will also point out that the final water 
transfer rule specifically states that it “has no effect on the 404 
permit program, under which discharges of dredged or fill 
material may be authorized by a permit,” because “Congress 
explicitly forbade discharges of dredged material except as in 
compliance with the provisions cited in . . . § 301.”  73 Fed. Reg. 
at 33,703 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)) (emphasis added).  
Additionally, the final rule “focuses exclusively on water transfers 
and does not affect any other activity that may be subject to 
NPDES permitting requirements.”  Id. at 33,697.  Bowman’s land 
clearing and wetlands filling are clearly not water transfers and 
thus fall under § 404.  Therefore, Bowman cannot apply the water 
transfer rule and underlying unitary waters theory to show that 
there has been no addition. 
C. Incidental Fallback 
Not all dredge and fill activity is regulated under the CWA.  
Under federal regulation, the “incidental fallback”12 of material 
during dredging does not fall within CWA jurisdiction because it 
is not considered an addition.  “[B]ecause incidental fallback 
represents a net withdrawal, not an addition, of material, it 
cannot be a discharge.”  Nat’l Mining Assoc. v. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The regulation and 
definition of incidental fallback has taken a convoluted, confusing 
path over the past few decades.  While excavation activity, 
including incidental fallback, was originally exempt from CWA 
regulation, EPA and the Corps attempted to regulate it as the 
redeposit of material several times (known as the Tulloch Rules).  
This regulation was rejected by the courts.  However, there is still 
ambiguity as to the definition of incidental fallback.  See Radcliffe 
 
 12. Incidental fallback is a “situation in which material is removed from 
waters of the [U.S.] and a small portion of it happens to fall back.”  Nat’l Mining 
Assoc. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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Daniel IV, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Excavation 
Activities: The Tulloch Rule Revised, 38 COLO. LAW. 83 (July 
2009). 
Bowman may attempt to play on this lack of clarity as to 
what is incidental fallback and argue that his activities are 
exempt from CWA regulation.  While incidental fallback was 
earlier13 treated as a de minimis exemption, National Association 
of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers interpreted 
National Mining Association and noted that the volume of 
materials does not determine whether redeposit qualifies as 
incidental fallback.  No. 01-0274(JR), 2007 WL 259944 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 30, 2007).  Rather, the amount of time material is held and 
distance it travels between excavation and redeposit are 
important factors.  Id. at *3 (known as the “Silberman Factors”).  
Therefore, Bowman may contend that, even if he dropped a large 
amount of material into the wetland, he did not hold it for a long 
time or move it large distances and therefore it should be exempt 
as incidental fallback.  He may also point to the language of 
National Mining Association to argue that his actions did not 
result in a net addition of materials to the wetland and therefore 
they did not amount to a discharge.  145 F.3d at 1404. 
NUWF and NUDEP will differentiate Bowman’s activities 
from mere incidental fallback and argue that there was a non-
exempt addition.  They will characterize Bowman’s activities as 
the redeposit of large amounts of pollutants in the wetland – he 
moved almost one thousand acres of plant material and soil 
within his property in order to turn it into a wheat field.  In 
response to Bowman’s argument based on the “Silberman 
Factors,” NUDEP and NUWF will argue that his activities 
necessitated holding materials for longer than and moving 
materials farther than activities typically resulting in incidental 
fallback, such as shoveling material into a dump truck.  Although 
the facts are not specific here, the parties do know that Bowman 
moved materials from the high portions of his thousand acres to 
the low portions, from which one might infer that he moved them 
significant distances.  They may point to Green Acres Enterprises, 
Inc. v. United States, which upheld the Corps’ regulation of 
 
 13. See id. 
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“bulldozer work where soil was redeposited from one place to 
another in waters of the United States by bulldozer blades, while 
trees, limbs, vegetation, root wads and brush were pushed into 
stockpiles, and land was leveled.  These kinds of activities result 
in more than ‘incidental fallback.’”  418 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed 
in written submission by teams.  One should appreciate 
reasoned and reasonable creativity and ideas beyond 
those in this limited analysis. 
 
SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 These questions are suggested as a starting point.  Please 
feel free to develop your own. 
 
Issue 1 (Standing) Questions 
 NUWF and NUDEP 
o Is there a sufficient injury in this case under 
Laidlaw if the NUWF members have not refrained 
from using the Muddy River in response to 
Bowman’s actions? 
o If Lujan requires an injury to a “legally protected 
interest,” how can you argue that an injury to Mr. 
Norton’s illegal frogging supports standing? 
o If there is no clear injury to the environment, how 
can NUWF have standing? 
 Bowman 
o Under Laidlaw, aren’t the NUWF members’ 
concerns and fears about the effects of your client’s 
wetland destruction enough to show an injury-in-
fact? 
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o Hasn’t the Supreme Court stated that aesthetic 
enjoyment need only be lessened – not completely 
eliminated – to create a cognizable injury-in-fact? 
o Has the Supreme Court ever prevented the use of 
illegally-obtained evidence in a civil case? 
Issue 2 (Continuing Violation) Questions 
 NUWF 
o Does Marina Point, in which the defendant showed 
clear signs that it would violate again and 
disobeyed orders from a government agency, apply 
to this case?  Hasn’t Mr. Bowman been very 
cooperative and compliant with the government? 
o Sasser was an administrative enforcement action 
while this one is a citizen suit.  Does that change 
your argument in favor of finding a continuing 
violation? 
o You argue that accepting your opponents’ 
continuing violation theory would prevent 
enforcement of § 404 against violators, but wouldn’t 
the government be able to enforce the law? 
 Bowman and NUDEP 
o Sasser was an administrative enforcement action 
while this one is a citizen suit.  Does that affect 
your argument against finding a continuing 
violation? 
o If a continuing violation ends once the act of filling 
the wetland does, doesn’t this present a major 
enforcement problem for § 404? 
o Isn’t the continuing violation doctrine a long-
recognized, equitable defense to the statute of 
limitations bar? 
Issue 3 (Diligent Prosecution) Questions 
 NUWF 
o NUDEP has required that Bowman stop destroying 
his wetlands, grant a public easement on his 
property, and build a year-round wetland for frogs.  
31
  
2013] NELMCC BENCH MEMO 47 
 
They have even brought suit to enforce these 
requirements.  How has NUDEP not been diligent 
in prosecuting this matter? 
o Would insisting that Bowman pay a penalty for his 
CWA violation hinder his ability to perform the 
remediation that NUDEP has ordered him to do? 
o Citizen suits are meant to supplement state 
enforcement where the state is unwilling to act.  
Since the state has acted, what is the purpose of 
this citizen suit? 
 Bowman and NUDEP 
o Isn’t it true that some courts have found that the 
failure to assess civil penalties amounts to a lack of 
diligent prosecution?  How do you differentiate this 
case from those? 
o Is the remediation required of Bowman comparable 
to the remediation required in other cases where no 
civil penalty was assessed? 
o Would failing to issue a penalty to Bowman cause 
him to realize an economic benefit as a result of his 
polluting actions? 
Issue 4 (Addition) Questions 
 NUWF and NUDEP 
o How can Bowman’s land clearing activities be 
considered an “addition” of a pollutant when they 
simply resulted in moving materials from one area 
of his wetland property to another area of that 
property? 
o If there was no “net addition” of material to 
Bowman’s property, how does this amount to an 
addition of pollutants under the CWA? 
o Courts have held that the same term used in 
different parts of the same statute has the same 
meaning unless Congress has clearly provided 
otherwise.  Why should the “outside world” 
definition of pollution, made in the context of § 402 
of the CWA, not apply to § 404 of the CWA? 
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 Bowman 
o Isn’t the EPA’s interpretation of “addition” in the § 
404 context different than its interpretation of that 
term in the § 402 context?  If so, can the unitary 
waters theory apply here? 
o If the redeposit of dredged spoil into a wetland has 
harmful consequences to the environment, why 
shouldn’t it be regulated under the CWA? 
o How can we apply the unitary waters rule in this 
case when the water transfers rule explicitly states 
that it “has no effect on the 404 permit program?” 
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